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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TORT LIABILITY-LIABILITY FOR TORTS COM-
MITTED BY MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES IN EXERCISE OF GOVERNMENTAL FUNC-
TIONS-Plaintiff sued the Town of Cocoa Beach for damages for the alleged 
wrongful death of her husband.1 Plaintiff's husband had died of smoke 
suffocation after being locked in a jail which was left unattended by the 
city jailor. The lower court dismissed plaintiff's complaint. On appeal, 
held, reversed. A person injured by the negligence of a municipal employ-
ee acting within the scope of his employment may recover against the 
municipal corporation. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, (Fla. 1957) 96 
S. (2d) 130. 
The present case is the first, absent statute, to abolish the historical 
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions and to hold 
municipal corporations liable for the negligence of their employees re-
gardless of the type of function being performed.2 The traditional view3 
is that municipal corporations are immune in the exercise of governmen-
tal functions but responsible for torts committed by employees in the 
exercise of proprietary functions.4 While different standards are frequently 
applied to characterize municipal functions, the general view is that 
those pertaining to fire protection, police services, education, and health 
are governmental and those pertaining to utilities and income-producing 
property are proprietary.'> Three principal arguments have been used 
to sustain the modern doctrine of municipal immunity for torts occurring 
in the performance of governmental functions.6 (1) When performing 
governmental functions, a municipality acts as a subdivision of the state 
and is entitled to share in the state's sovereign immunity. (2) When per-
forming governmental functions, a municipal servant's master is the state, 
not the municipality. (3) Public policy requires that municipal funds not 
be diverted into the payment of private claims. Relying on this reasoning 
shoremen's &: W. Union, note 4 supra, suggests this test: Are the two enterprises the 
same? Substantially the same criterion is proposed by International Brotherhood v. 
NLRB, (2d Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 34, affd. 341 U.S. 694 (1951): Can the secondary employer 
freely discontinue doing business with the primary employer? Such a test would really 
eliminate the "ally" doctrine and give literal interpretation to the "doing business" 
aspect of §8(b) (4) (A); no account would be taken of any injurious effects created by the 
association of the two employers, which were "doing business." 
1 Fla. Stat. (1955) §768.01. 
2 But see Fowler, Admx. v. Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919), 9 A.L.R. 
471 at 473, overruled by Aldrich v. Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922). 
3 See generally Barker v. Sante Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136 P. (2d) 480 (1943); 18 McQUII.LIN, 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §§53.23 to 53.39 (1950); 2 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TION LAW §§11.00 to 11.05 (1955). 
4 The origin of this rule is traceable to Russel v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667, 100 
Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). See Barnett, "The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public 
and Private Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Cor-
porations," 16 ORE. L. REv. 250 (1937). 
11 See RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW §30-2, pp. 734-735 (1957); 18 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §53.30 (1950). 
6 See note 3 supra. 
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other state courts,7 as well as Florida,8 had prior to this decision held 
municipalities to be immune for negligence resulting in injury to pris-
oners on the ground that the operation of a jail is a strictly governmental 
function. However, in obliterating the governmental-proprietary dis-
tinction underlying the municipal immunity doctrine the Florida court 
feels that the common law maxim which has supported the distinction, 
i.e., the king can do no wrong, is an anachronistic concept, and it specif-
ically rejects the argument that it is better for an individual to suffer a 
grievous wrong than to impose liability on the people vicariously.9 The 
trend of past decisions of the Florida Supreme Court greatly facilitated 
its conclusion.10 The court states that the doctrine of respondeat superior 
is applicable.11 It confines its present holding, however, to negligent 
acts; whether it will hold respondeat superior applicable with respect to 
intentional acts is uncertain.12 In addition, it is doubtful that the court 
intends to reject the immunity doctrine with respect to the state itself. 
It avoids the problem by characterizing the modern municipality as a 
business corporation13 operated primarily for the benefit of its residents, 
rather than as a governmental subdivision, exercising its powers primarily 
on behalf of the state itself. The court expressly rejects municipal liability 
for torts occurring in the exercise of legislative or judicial functions.14 
Policy considerations require freedom from any restraints in this regard.15 
"\,Vhile there has been an increasing amount of judicial criticism of 
the doctrine of municipal immunity and a general refusal to extend 
the classification of governmental functions,16 stare decisis has prevented 
other courts from taking the position of the Florida court. By legisla-
tion, however, there has been general waiver of immunity in Great 
7 See 46 A.L.R. 94 (1927); 50 A.L.R. 268 (1927); 61 A.L.R. 569 (1929). 
s Williams v. Green Cove Springs, (Fla. 1953) 65 S. (2d) 56. 
9 Principal case at 132. 
10 See Price and Smith, "Municipal Tort Liability: A Continuing Enigma," 6 
UNIV. FLA. L. REv. 330 (1953). Principal case at 133. 
11 For agreement with this see Flait v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, 48 Del. 
(9 Terry) 89, 97 A. (2d) 545 (1953). 
12 The modern law of agency generally holds the master liable when the use of 
force is a natural incident to the servant's job or if the wrongful means are used to 
promote the master's business. MECHEM, AGENCY, 4th ed., §§394 to 401 (1952). Rejection 
of liability would ultimately be based on :the ultra vires nature of an implied command 
to commit a wrongful act. But this legal fiction has long been discredited. Respondeat 
superior is merely a means of allocating risk. If policy suggests that the municipality 
should be held liable, the legality of the servant's act should be irrelevant. For a gen-
eral discussion see Miami v. Bethel, (Fla. 1953) 65 S. (2d) 34. 
13 See Kaufman v. Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 S. 697 (1922). 
14 Principal case at 133. 
15 See Smith, "Municipal Tort Liability," 48 MICH. L. REv. 41 at 49 (1949); 2 ANTIEAU, 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION •LAW §11.09, p. 96 (1955). 
16 See, e.g., Madison v. City and County of San Francisco, 106 Cal. App. (2d) 232, 
234 P. (2d) 995 (1951); Britton v. Eau Claire, 260 Wis. 382, 51 N.W. (2d) 30 (1952); Flait 
v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, note 11 supra. 
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Britain,17 the federal government,18 and New York,19 coupled with partial 
waiver by almost every other state.20 This gradual erosion of the historical 
doctrine of municipal tort immunity presents the practical problem of 
crippling municipal treasuries through payment of numerous claims. 
Several courts have recently reaffirmed the immunity doctrine solely on 
the basis of this rationale,21 recognizing the acuteness of the problem 
for municipalities having a small net worth.22 To alleviate this problem 
it is suggested that execution could be withheld with respect to essential 
municipal funds. A more complete solution, perhaps, lies in the increased 
use of liability insurance to assure both individual recompense for torts 
committed by municipal employees and continued municipal solvency.23 
17 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44 (1947). 
18 28 u.s.c. (1952) §2674. 
10 Court of Claims Act, N .Y. Laws (1939) c. 860, §8. 
Ralph E. Boches 
20 See Leflar and Kantrowitz, "Tort Liability of the States," 29 N.Y. UNn•. L. R.Ev. 
1363 (1954). 
21 E.g., Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consol. School District No. 201, 348 Ill. 
App. 567, 109 N.E. (2d) 636 (1953); ~.fcCloud v. City of LaFollette, 38 Tenn • .App. 553, 
276 S.W. (2d) 763 (1954). 
22 Cf. Warp, "Tort Liability Problems of Small Municipalities," 9 LAW AND CoNTEIII. 
PROB. 363 (1942). 
23 Many states already require insurance to be carried. But since an insurance con-
tract is one of indemnification, most states, absent statute, have denied recovery. How-
ever, recovery can still be justified on two grounds: (I) to the extent of coverage the 
municipality has waived its immunity. (2) The contract is for the protection of the mu-
nicipal employee, and constitutes a "fringe benefit" of his employment contract. See gen-
erally 54 MICH. L. R.Ev. 404 (1956). 
